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Abstract 
 
Proponents of JIT techniques often argue that Japanese manufacturing techniques are among the 
best in the world. On the other hand, critiques have called the JIT manufacturing techniques 
“management by stress” and that they are often associated with high work intensity, stress, and 
fatigue. Prompted by some recent findings, organizational theorists began to question whether 
these new work practices will have a sustaining effect on performance. Consistent with the social 
technical systems theory, this study suggests that unless complimentary changes also occur in oth-
er related systems within an organization, the perceived productivity gain of a new work system 
may not be realized. Findings provide some support for the hypotheses tested. For example, re-
sults show by itself JIT does not lead to performance gains. Similarly, findings show that incentive 
pay or extrinsic motivation per se is not associated with better manufacturing performance. In-
stead, results show JIT interacts with performance goals to produce lower manufacturing costs 
only when incentive pay is used. For plants using fixed pay, however, manufacturing costs are a 
decreasing function of performance goals but a marginal increasing function of JIT. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
ecent research findings have cast some doubt over the success of new work practices, also known as 
alternate work practices (see Godard, 2001; Osterman, 2000). These new work practices often in-
clude some combination of work reorganization, such as autonomous work team, increased job train-
ing, job rotation, and multi-skilling. It is claimed that they transform work places into high performance models (see, 
for example, Ichniowski et al., 1996; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer, 1998)). Using a sample of 508 employed 
Canadians, Godard (2001) reported that moderate levels of these new work practices were associated with increased 
empowerment, task involvement, and ultimately job satisfaction. At higher levels of adoption, however, these asso-
ciations declined in magnitude and even became negative. Moreover, some of the new work practices, such as JIT 
and re-engineering programs, were associated with more stressful work. 
 
In a separate study, Osterman (2000) reported that although “high performance work organizations” con-
tinue to diffuse at a rapid rate at the later part of the 1990‟s, they were associated with increased layoff rates and 
with no compensation gains.  Given these findings, organizational theorists began to question whether these new 
work practices will have a sustained performance enhancement effect. On the other hand, NUMMI (New United 
Motors Manufacturing, Inc), the General Motors–Toyota joint venture in Fremont, California, has often being cited 
as one of the leanest approaches to build automobiles. Productivity, since its inception in 1984, remains one which 
few other assembly plants in the North American can match (Adler & Goldoftas, 1999; Black, 1999). Because of 
these mixed findings, there is a growing interest in understanding factors which inhibit successful implementation of 
new work practices. In particular, interests in how to blend the Japanese thinking and philosophies into the Ameri-
can work experience remain high. 
 
_________________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
R 
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Proponents of JIT techniques often argue that the Japanese manufacturing management techniques are 
among the best in the world (see, for example, Schongerger, 1982; Womack et al., 1992). On the other hand, criti-
ques have called the JIT manufacturing techniques “management by stress”. Under JIT, the best practice remains an 
ever shifting target.  Often, these moving targets present some form of stress to workers and incidents of cumulative 
trauma disorders in these work places have intensified greatly (Fairris and Brenner, 2001). Critics have often argued 
that Japanese management techniques are associated with high work intensity, stress, and fatique and thus they out-
weigh the benefits. (Fucini and Fucini, 1990; Babson, 1993; Lewchuck et al., 1997; Rienhart et al., 1997; Landsber-
gis et al., 1999).  For example, a survey of workers at the Mazda plant in Flat Rock, Michigan, revealed that three-
quarters of the surveyed work force felt that their work pace was so intense that they would be either injured or worn 
out before they reached retirement (Babson, 1993). 
 
Research findings on JIT implementation are, in most part mixed. Inman and Mehra (1993) found a signifi-
cant relationship between financial success and JIT implementation while Balakrishnan et al. (1996) found some-
what weak results with respect to differences in return on assets between JIT and non-JIT firms.  More recently, 
Alles et al. (2000) showed that lowering inventory and increaseing the skill levels of workers are related to improved 
process reliability, product quality, and cost. On the other hand, Dean and Snell (1996) reported no significant rela-
tionship between JIT implementation and manufacturing performance. Similarly, Sakakibara et al. (1997) found no 
significant relationship between the use of JIT practices and manufacturing performance.  These mixed findings, 
however, can be explained by some extant literature.  For example, social technical systems theory states that 
changes in a work system can affect the cultural, behavioral, and political environment of a work place. Thus, unless 
complimentary changes also occur in other related systems, such as the decision right system, human resource sys-
tem, or reward system, the perceived productivity gain of a new work system may not be realized (Cummings and 
Blumberg, 1987; Wruck and Jensen, 1994; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995). Accordingly, the aim of the paper is 
to examine the facotrs which will compliment JIT or the Japanese manufacturing techniques, thereby leading to bet-
ter manufacturing performance (as measured in terms of reduction in manufacturing costs). 
 
2.0  Theoretical Development And Hypotheses 
 
This section reviews prior literature relevant to this study, which includes studies on JIT manufacturing 
techniques and management control systems. This is followed by the identification of hypotheses to be tested. 
 
2.1  JIT Manufacturing Techniques 
 
JIT programs rely on persistence in pursuing continuous incremental improvement in manufacturing opera-
tions. A vital part of every Just-in-Time manufacturing is the reduction of setup time, lot sizes, and inventories. 
Smaller lot sizes lead to shorter manufacturing cycle time and indirectly help to reduce scrap and rework associated 
with process failure. Likewise, a lower level of buffer stock calls for „doing things right the first time.‟ Thus, im-
proving quality is also an important part of any JIT implementation. In a JIT environment, the task of improving 
manufacturing capabilities lies in the hands of workers. Responsibility for detecting non-conforming items shifts 
from a quality control department to line personnel. A continuous improvement philosophy calls for each worker to 
be responsible for quality control and for stopping the production process when there is a problem. In addition, 
workers are encouraged to identify ways to improve product and process quality (Fine, 1993; Groenevelt, 1993). 
 
Continuous improvement in the manufacturing processes, a key feature of JIT, should lead to increased 
productivity and hence lower manufacturing costs.  Likewise, job rotation removes monotony in a repetitive manu-
facturing environment.   Moreover, increased participation among workers and the greater autonomy delegated to 
workers under JIT often increase job satisfaction, which in turn should lead to improved performance or higher 
productivity. Finally, supplier-relation management further enhanced the JIT philosophy. For example, NUMMI, 
following the Toyota philosophy, usually keeps one or two suppliers per part, challenges their suppliers to make 
product and process improvement, and works with them when problems arise. As mentioned earlier, successful im-
plementation of advanced manufacturing systems such as JIT requires changes in management control systems. Ac-
cordingly, the next section addresses issues related to management control systems. 
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2.2  Management Control Systems 
 
Management control systems are sets of tools used to motivate employee‟s behavior towards the attainment 
of organizational goals. As a result, management accountants and organizational theorists often make assumptions 
about human behaviors when designing controls. Within the context of controls, Simons (1995a, 1995b) assumes 
that people want to contribute, do right, achieve, and create. However, in the absence of leadership or control, indi-
viduals will become self-interested and work for their own benefit with little regard to organizational goals. Under-
lying Simons‟ theory is the assumption that despite some structural advantages associated with the JIT system, 
productivity gain may not be realized unless complimentary control mechanisms are in place. Since JIT techniques 
are closely in line with Japanese thinking and philosophy, modifications should be made in American management 
control systems such that the benefit of the JIT techniques can be realized. As such, this paper focuses on the role of 
performance evaluation systems as a tool for promoting extrinsic motivation whereby leading to productivity gain in 
a JIT environment. In particular, the performance evaluation system will comprise of two subsystems, namely, the 
information system and the reward system. 
 
2.3  Information Systems 
 
2.3.1  Performance goals and Attention-directing feedback 
 
In a comprehensive review of the literature on goal setting, Locke and Latham (1990) concluded that goals 
positively influence the attention, effort, and persistence of employees.  This conclusion is robust across studies that 
examined self-set, participatively set, or assigned goals, across both laboratory and field settings. In addition, from a 
learning standpoint, providing performance feedback helps employees develop effective task strategies in both com-
plex and novel tasks (Locke et al., 1981; Locke and Latham, 1990; Latham and Locke, 1991). In fact, Banker et al. 
(1993, p. 33) indicate that the reporting of manufacturing performance measures to workers is associated with the 
implementation of JIT, teamwork, and total quality management practices. Thus, in an environment that calls for 
continuous improvement, it is imperative that the information system should provide performance goals as well as 
attention-directing feedback to workers. 
 
 On the other hand, because of a lower inventory in a JIT production system, workers tend to get task feed-
back about their own work even in the absence of attention-directing feedback.  For example, Claxton and Foster 
(1990) present anecdotal evidence indicating that process visibility is enhanced when inventories are minimized. In-
deed, in a laboratory study, Schultz et al. (1997) supported their hypothesis that JIT increases task feedback. Conse-
quently, this raises the question as to whether providing attention-directing feedback is crucial for employees to de-
velop effective task strategies in a JIT production system because of the transparency or shorter feedback loop inhe-
rent in a JIT production system. Accordingly, this study will revisit this issue again. 
 
 Sarkar (1997) provides support for expecting strong complementarities between process improvement and 
information sharing. Results show that process improvement in quality is enhanced when information sharing is en-
couraged in the work place. Thus, information systems that provide performance goals and attention-directing feed-
back to workers will enhance manufacturing performance. Specifically, although performance goals or attention-
directing feedback may be effective independently of JIT implementation, it is the synergy between manufacturing 
systems (JIT) and information systems (performance goals and attention-directing feedback) that produce higher 
synergistic performance. 
 
2.3.2  The Reward System 
 
To many researchers, the benefits of tying pay to performance are obvious (see, for example, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Baker et al., 1988; Wruck and Jensen, 1994). Yet, firms often resist introducing bonus-based com-
pensation plans. One explanation offered by social psychologists or behaviorists is that monetary reward can be 
counter productive. For example, Deming (1986) states that extrinsic rewards diminish the intrinsic value and moti-
vation of the work. Other critics argue that although financial incentive schemes improve productivity, they also in-
duce significant adverse side effects which outweigh the limited organizational benefits they offer (Hemner, 1975; 
Beer et al., 1984).  
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Baker et al. (1988), however, suggest otherwise. Their careful examination of the criticisms of pay-for-
performance systems indicates that problems arise not because that these systems are ineffective, but rather because 
they are too effective. According to Baker et al. (1988, p. 597), “strong pay-for-performance motivates people to do 
exactly what they are told to do. Large monetary incentives generate unintended and sometimes counterproductive 
results because it is difficult to adequately specify exactly what people should do and therefore how their perfor-
mance should be measured.” Consistent with this argument, it appears that in a manufacturing environment that sets 
goals for continuous improvement in manufacturing processes, the so called side effects of pay-for-performance can 
be minimized because the appropriate performance matrices are often centered around manufacturing performances. 
 
 In an observational study of an engine plant, Klein (1987) suggests that JIT can be very stressful – stressful 
for the slow person and stressful for the fast person.  Similarly, Schonberger (1982, p. 27) wrote: “In the Toyota 
Kanban system, for example, each time that workers succeed in correcting the causes of recent irregularity . . . the 
managers remove still more buffer stock. The workers are never allowed to settle into a comfortable pattern; or ra-
ther, the pattern becomes one of continuously perfecting the production process.” Because of a higher stress level as 
well as a higher expectation of workers‟ commitment and their performance, it is likely that workers will demand a 
more equitable pay. In view of this, in the absence of incentive pay, it is likely that there may be a lack of synergy 
between JIT and information systems. Conversely, the interactions between JIT systems and information systems 
(i.e., performance goals and more frequent attention-directing feedback) are dependent on the reward system (i.e., 
incentive vs. fixed pay plans). As a result, the following hypotheses are formulated. 
 
H1: The favorable interaction effect of JIT and performance goals on manufacturing costs is dependent on the re-
ward system. 
H2: The favorable interaction effect of JIT and attention-directing feedback on manufacturing costs is dependent on 
the reward system. 
 
3.0  Research Methodology 
 
This study investigates JIT implementation and the choice of reward and information systems (i.e., perfor-
mance goals and attention-directing feedback) on manufacturing performance (as measured by changes in manufac-
turing costs).  The research methodology employed to study the main and interaction effects is summarized below. 
 
3.1  Sample Selection 
 
Balakrishnan et al. (1996) reported that 68 percent of JIT firms (i.e., those that have adopted the JIT con-
cept for a substantial portion of their operations) clustered within the three SIC codes 35, 36 and 38. Thus, the sam-
ple for the study was drawn from the electronics industry (SIC code 36). Letters requesting participation in the re-
search study were sent to the directors of manufacturing of 1,500 randomly selected plants located within the United 
States with annual sales of ten million dollars and above.  A total of 173 responses was received, with nineteen res-
pondents indicating that they were either non-manufacturing or that their manufacturing was done overseas.  Thus, 
they were not appropriate sampling units for the study.  A further twenty-five plants indicated that they would not 
participate in the study.  More important, a total of 126 plants agreed to participate in the study and three plants 
wished to review the questionnaire prior to making a commitment to participate. As a result, a total of 129 question-
naires were mailed out.  About 50 percent of the firms replied within four weeks.  Six weeks after the initial mailing 
of the questionnaires, a status report, together with a reminder to complete the questionnaire, was sent to all 129 
plants.  In total, 77 useable responses were received, giving a response rate of about 60 percent. 
 
3.2  Independent Variable Measures 
 
Four independent variables (namely, Just-in-Time, contingent reward system, performance goals, and feed-
back) were included in the study (see Appendix A). Where a variable consists of multiple items, an average score 
across the items represents the score for that variable. 
 
3.2.1  Just-In-Time (JIT) 
The Review of Business Information Systems                                                                              Volume 7, Number 3 
 75 
 
The JIT scale was adapted from Sim and Killough (1998), which was a modified scale from Snell and Dean 
(1992). Snell and Dean (1992) developed a 10-item scale anchored on a 7-point Likert scale to measure JIT adop-
tion. Sim and Killough (1998) retained eight of the above items. The first omitted item relates to the extent to which 
the accounting system reflects costs of manufacturing. This item loaded onto the TQM construct in the Snell and 
Dean (1992) study and did not seem to reflect a JIT construct.  The second omitted item asked whether the plant was 
laid out by process or product. Group technology is often part of JIT implementation but not a necessary condition. 
Perhaps, that is why this item has a low loading score in Snell and Dean (1992).  Sim and Killough added one item 
to their modified JIT scale. This item asked whether “time spent to achieve a more orderly engineering change by 
improving the stability of the production schedule.”  Cronbach alpha for the JIT measure is 0.63. 
 
3.2.2  The Reward System 
 
 The reward system consists of two categories, namely “fixed pay only” or “incentive plan”.  Specifically, 
plants using “fixed pay only” were coded as “0”, while the remaining plants were coded as “1", resulting in a dicho-
tomous variable. 
 
3.2.3  Performance Goals and Attention-Directing Feedback  
 
 To enhance manufacturing performance, contemporary information systems set goals or “targets to 
achieve” as well as provide attention-directing feedback to workers. A total of 11 attributes was chosen as  “targets 
and attention-directing feedback” that were deemed important measures in a manufacturing setting. These attributes, 
or performance matrix, pertain to customer, delivery, quality, and cycle time performance. The performance matrix 
was cross referenced with Practices and Techniques: Managing Quality Improvements (Institute of Management 
Accountants 1993) to make sure that they represent important performance measures recommended in the literature.  
Using the performance matrix, respondents were asked whether “specific numeric targets” or goals and “perfor-
mance feedback” were provided to the workers. Performance goals were anchored on two points, 1=Yes or 0=No; 
while frequency of feedback information was anchored on a 5-point Likert scale (5= Daily, 1=Never). The Cronbach 
alphas for performance goals and attention-directing feedback are 0.69 and 0.70 respectively. 
 
3.3  Dependent Variable Measure 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the change in manufacturing costs in the last three years, anchoring on 
a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=“decrease tremendously”, 3=“no change” and 5=“increase tremendously”.1 
 
3.4  Control Variables 
 
To control for the size effect across the sample companies, the variable SIZE is included in the regression 
model as a control variable. This is measured in terms of annual sales. As discussed earlier, in a JIT setting, conti-
nuous improvement of the production processes lies with the workers, i.e., instead of leaving the job design to me-
thods engineering department, workers are actively involved in the process of job design and redesign through the 
“standardized work” process. Accordingly, the extent to which workers was empowered should affect successful 
implementation of JIT programs. Thus, workers‟ empowerment is included in the model. The measure for empo-
werment is adapted from Sim and Carey (2002) and operationalized using four items on a 7-point Likert scale of 1 = 
“Strongly Disagree” to 7 = “Strongly Agree”. Using principal component analysis, all four items loaded onto the 
same factor, with 56% of variance explained and a Cronbach alpha of 0.73. Appendix A provides detailed informa-
tion on the empowerment scale. 
 
 
 
3.5  Research Model and Testing Procedures 
                                                     
1  Multiple performance measures (dependent variables) were collected for the purpose of a large scale study.  
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 As discussed earlier, manufacturing performance can be improved with JIT, performance goals (GOAL) 
and more frequent attention-directing feedback (FEEDBACK).  In particular, it is argued that JIT interacts with 
GOAL and FEEDBACK to affect performance.  However, this interaction is dependent on the reward system 
(COMPENSATION), dichotomized in this study as incentive and fixed pay.  It is hypothesized that in the presence 
of incentive pay, JIT interacts favorably with GOAL and/or FEEDBACK to enhance performance.  Conversely, in 
the presence of fixed (non-incentive) pay, the favorable interaction described above is reduced or eliminated. 
 
 Multiple regression with interaction terms is used to test the research hypotheses.  The dependent variable 
(performance) is measured by changes in manufacturing costs.  The independent variables form the main and inte-
raction effects, with the main effects being JIT, GOAL, FEEDBACK and COMPENSATION.  The two-way inte-
raction effects included are JIT*GOAL, JIT*FEEDBACK and JIT*COMPENSATION.  Finally, the research hypo-
theses are tested with the following two three-way interaction effects: JIT*GOAL*COMPENSATION and 
JIT*FEEDBACK*COMPENSATION. 
 
As per the research hypotheses, the three-way interaction effects are expected to be statistically significant.  
If they are found to be, the significant three-way interaction effects will be further examined using interaction plots 
(showing the effect of COMPENSATION [i.e., incentive pay versus fixed pay] on the interaction between JIT and 
GOAL/FEEDBACK).  This approach is particularly useful when examining the theory of “fit” (Arnold, 1984; Stone 
and Hollenbeck, 1984; Hartmann and Moers, 1999). It is noted that when interaction effects are included in regres-
sion models, it is common to find significant multicollinearity which may confound the results.  This problem is 
handled in the study by centering the variables (Jaccard et al., 1990; Hartmann and Moers, 1999).  
 
4.0  Results And Discussion 
 
 This section discusses the descriptive statistics, results related to the research hypotheses and the findings. 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 About 50 percent of the sample had annual sales of between 10 to 50 million dollars. There are 16 plants 
with annual sales of more than $100 Million. Table 1 summarizes the respondents‟ job titles.  As shown, most res-
pondents are key personnel who are closely associated with manufacturing operations.  Table 2 shows the means, 
standard deviations and zero-order correlations.  The correlation matrix suggests that manufacturing plants that 
made greater use of JIT also made greater use of the incentive-pay reward system, more frequently set goals on op-
erational performance, and more frequently provided attention-directing feedback to their workers as well as give 
more autonomy to them.  There is, however, no association between incentive pay and improvement in manufactur-
ing costs. 
 
 
Table 1 – Job Title of Respondents 
Job Title Used by Respondents Respondents 
Plant Manager, Manufacturing Manager or Operations Manager. 21 
VP of Operations, VP of Engineering, VP of Manufacturing or VP of Quality 22 
Director of Operations, Director of Manufacturing or Director of Engineering. 12 
CEO, President and CEO, Executive VP or President 5 
Miscellaneous Titles such as Materials Manager, Test Manager, or Product Integrity Manager. 11 
No Information on Job Title 6 
Total Respondents 77 
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Table 2 - Zero Order Correlation 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                    Std. Cronbach  
Variable                 Mean Dev. Alpha    1 2   3   4  5   6   7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
JIT   4.69  0.65  0.63 
Size   2.63 1.13 N/A 0.14  
Empowerment  3.40 1.25 0.73 0.21# -.11  
Compensation type 0.55  0.50  N/A 0.30** -.02 0.26* 
Goal-setting  0.65  0.26  0.69 0.44*** 0.09 0.22#  0.09 
Feedback  2.95  0.62  0.79 0.34**  0.19# .034** 0.20#  0.45*** 
Change in manufacturing costs 2.03  0.89  N/A -0.14 -0.04 -0.19# -0.09 -0.23* -0.06 
Improvement in quality costs 2.22  0.76  N/A 0.21# 0.08 0.11 0.26* 0.29** 0.11 -0.30***  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: 0.18 - 0.22 (p = 0.10)# 
0.23 - 0.28 (p = 0.05)* 
> 0.28        (p = 0.01)** 
>0.38        (p= 0.001)*** 
 
 
 Table 3 summarizes the results of the regression analysis.  Given the research hypotheses, emphasis is 
placed on the three-way interaction terms. The regression model is significant with a p-value of 0.01.  The Adjusted 
R-square is 16.36%. Also, at a significance level of 0.05, both the three-way interaction effects 
(JIT*GOAL*COMPENSATION and JIT*FEEDBACK* COMPENSATION) are statistically significant, with p-
values of 0.03 and 0.05, respectively. Finally, it can be noted from the low variance inflation factors in Table 3 (VIF 
 5) that no significant multicollinearity problems are detected in the regression analysis. 
 
 
Table 3 - Multiple Regression Results of Manufacturing Performance on JIT, Information and Reward Systems 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable    Coefficientt- statistic  p-value  VIF 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept    2.30   5.31  0.00***  0.00 
Size    0.04  -0.48  0.32      1.19 
Empowerment   0.06  -0.68  0.25  1.27 
JIT    0.01  -0.06  0.48  1.72 
Compensation type   0.01   0.12  0.45  1.44 
Goal-setting   -1.22  -2.83  0.00**  1.57 
Feedback    -0.06  -0.32  0.37  1.58 
JIT*Compensation-type  -0.10  -0.63  0.26  1.34 
JIT*Goal-setting   0.16   0.50  0.31  1.89 
JIT*Feedback   0.14      0.18  0.43  1.41 
JIT*Goal-setting*Compensation-type -1.50  -1.90  0.03*  1.84 
JIT*Feedback*Compensation-type 0.541      1.66  0.05*  1.89 
 
Model F-value = 2.32** 
Adj. R-square = 0.1636 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** p <0.001 
**  p < 0.01 
*   p < 0.05 
 
 
 To further analyze the significant interaction effects, the interaction plots are given in Figure 1, Panels A 
and B. In drawing the interaction plots, the medians of GOALS and FEEDBACK are used as cutoff points to sepa-
rate the sample into high/low goal-setting and high/low feedback, respectively.  As shown in Panel A, increasing le-
vels of JIT interact with higher levels of performance goals to improve manufacturing costs only in the presence of 
incentive pay.  With fixed pay, however, the JIT*GOAL interaction has an adverse effect on manufacturing costs.  
Also, the nature of the graph for the „fixed-pay‟ group suggests possible main effects for performance goals and JIT. 
Consequently, further regression analysis on the „fixed pay‟ group was tested for possible main effects and 2-way 
interaction effects.  Regression analysis results indicate that there is no significant 2-way interaction (JIT*GOAL, 
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JIT*FEEDBACK) within the fixed pay group; GOAL has a positive effect on performance (with p-value of 0.0001) 
while JIT has a marginal negative effect on performance (with p-value of 0.06). Note that the p-values shown in the 
figure indicate statistical differences in the high/low groups. These results provided support for hypothesis 1 and 
suggest that the favorable interaction effect of JIT and performance goals on manufacturing costs is dependent on 
the reward system. One plausible explanation for the negative effect of JIT on manufacturing costs for the fixed pay 
firms can be due to “mismatches”, as explained in the prior sections. 
 
 Figure 1, Panel B, shows that manufacturing costs are an increasing function of JIT and attention-directing 
feedback for firms using incentive pay while there is no synergy between attention-directing feedback and JIT for 
firms using fixed pay. These findings suggest that performance gain (i.e., reduction in manufacturing costs) is condi-
tional on the use of incentive pay. However, the highest improvement in quality costs (i.e., lowest manufacturing 
costs) is associated with firms using high JIT but low attention-directing feedback. Thus, hypothesis 2 is marginally 
supported. 
 
 
Figure 1: Three – Way Interaction 
Panel A - Changes in Manufacturing Costs, By JIT, Goals, and Compensation Type 
 
Panel B - Changes in Manufacturing Costs, by JIT, Feedback, and Compensation Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incentive Pay
0
1
2
3
4
5
JIT
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 
M
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
 
C
o
s
ts
Hi Goal Low Goal
Low High
(p=0.19)
(p=0.02)
Fixed  Pay
0
1
2
3
4
JIT
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 
M
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
 
C
o
s
ts
Hi Goal Low Goal
Low High
(p=0.04)
(p=0.23)
Incentive Pay
0
1
2
3
4
5
JIT
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 
M
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
 
C
o
s
ts
High FeedBack Low FeedBack
Low High
(p=0.10)
(p=0.08)
Fixed Pay
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
JIT
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 
M
a
n
u
fa
c
tu
ri
n
g
 C
o
s
ts
HighFeedBack Low FeedBack
Low High
(p=0.46)
(p=0.33)
Note:  Change in manufacturing cost anchoring on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1=“decrease tremendously”, 3=“no 
change” and 5=“increase tremendously”. 
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The weaker result for hypothesis 2 may be attributed to the nature of JIT manufacturing as previously dis-
cussed. That is as the level of inventory decreases, manufacturing processes become more transparent. It is plausible 
that JIT shorten the feedback loops while workers often receive immediate feedback regarding their own perfor-
mance since they investigate process improvements and monitor quality themselves. For example, Alles et al. (2000) 
suggest that lower inventories provide context-specific feedback about production problems thus improve workers‟ 
ability to identify and isolate the underlying causes whereby leading to improved quality performance.  Also, this 
finding is consistent with the finding that JIT increases task feedback (Schultz et al., 1997).  
 
5.0  Conclusion 
 
 At a time when organizational theorists were questioning the sustaining effects of new work practices, 
NUMMI‟s performance continue to surpass its peers.  Absenteeism at NUMMI still averages about 4 percent as 
compared to the national average of 10 percent. Per-vehicle build time ranks among the most efficient in the auto 
industry in North America. The plant‟s problem-solving circles continue to generate ideas for improvement. In 
1998, the teams generated more than 27,000 suggestions, an average of 6 suggestions per team. Overall, 88 percent 
of those suggestions were put into practice, yielding an estimated saving of $5.5 million (Black, 1999). While there 
are many contributing factors to the above success, most organizational theorists seem to agree that without the 
commitment and the support of the leadership in nurturing a committed, skilled, and autonomous workforce, many 
of the achievements may go unseen. Organizations that have carefully aligned their long-term interests with those of 
the workers will outperform those that are short sighted or those which often ignore the well-being of the workers. 
 
 Results of this study provided additional evidence on the new work practices, particularly in the area of 
Japanese manufacturing techniques. Despite the structural advantage and the associated intrinsic motivation embed-
ded in a JIT production system, by itself JIT does not lead to performance gains. Similarly, findings show that incen-
tive pay or extrinsic motivation per se is not associated with better manufacturing performance. Instead, it is the 
match between JIT and the performance evaluation systems (i.e., the information and reward systems) that produces 
higher manufacturing performance. In particular, it is found that a favorable interaction effect of JIT and information 
systems on manufacturing performance is often dependent on the reward system. 
 
 The findings of this study, while providing insight into the interaction effects of JIT and control systems on 
manufacturing performance, leave many unanswered questions that may be pursued by future research. For exam-
ple, it will be interesting to see whether it is the level of stress inherent in the JIT manufacturing that has produced 
the adverse effect on manufacturing costs when a high level of performance goals is used in conjunction with fixed 
pay. In addition, although stress has often been cited as one important side effect of the JIT manufacturing, it was 
not examined in the present study. Future studies can examine the level of stress and its effect on performance in a 
cross-sectional study. Finally, additional features of incentives can be investigated, including tournament vs. cooper-
ative, monetary vs. non-monetary, and pay vs. promotion. 
 
The findings in this study should be interpreted in the light of two potential limitations. The first limitation 
relates to the small sample size. Because of the small sample size, some sensitivity tests were conducted. First, using 
the cutoff point of annual sales of $10 million and above, there were slightly over 5000 plants in the population.  
Accordingly, the distribution of the sample by geographic region was compared to that of a random sample of 3,000 
electronic plants.  The chi-square test shows a p-value of 0.99, indicating no significant difference. Next, the 4-digit 
SIC code was used as a basis for comparison.  Manufacturing USA-Industry Analysis, Statistics, and Leading Com-
panies (1992) shows that the leading companies clustered within five industries (i.e., SIC codes 3621, 3661, 3663, 
3674 and 3679).  In contrast, the sample in the study clustered within six industries, five of which are the same in-
dustries as those reported in Manufacturing USA (the addition being SIC code 3651).  However, the implications of 
non-response bias cannot be totally ruled out.  For example, the average sample plant may be smaller than an aver-
age plant in the electronics industry even though an annual sales of $10 million and above was used as a cutoff 
point.  Unfortunately, information on average sales at the plant level was not available from any published sources 
to permit an assessment of any such bias. The second limitation of the study is the reliance on self-report measures. 
Secondary sources were not available to verify the reported data.    
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Appendix A - Questionnaire 
 
I. Just In Time 
(Anchored by 1=Not at All or Very Little, 4=To Some Extent, and 7=Completely or A Great Deal) 
1. Are products pulled through the plant by the final assembly schedule/master production schedule? 
2. How much attention is devoted to minimizing set up time? 
3. How closely/consistent are predetermined preventive maintenance plans adhered to? 
4. How much time is spent in achieving a more orderly engineering change by improving the stability of the production sche-
dule? 
 
How much has each of the following changed in the past three years? 
(Anchored by 1=large Decrease, 4=Same, and 7=Large Increase) 
 
*5. Number of your suppliers   
*6. Frequency of the deliveries 
*7. Length of product runs      
*8. Amount of buffer stock     
*9.  Number of total parts in Bill of Material  
* Reverse Coding 
 
ii. The Reward System 
1. How are plant workers currently being compensated? (please circle only one). 
 
a. Strictly individual fixed pay only 
b. Individual fixed pay + non-monetary reward 
c. Individual fixed pay + individual-based monetary incentive 
d. Individual fixed pay + group-based monetary incentive 
 
iii. Attention-Directing Feedback 
 
In this section, we are interested in the availability and frequency of performance feedback provided to the shop floor personnel.  
Please indicate the frequency of feedback by circling the appropriate number from 1 to 5. 
 
1=NEVER       2=OCCASIONALLY         3=MONTHLY        4=WEEKLY         5=DAILY  
 
CUSTOMER PERCEPTION  
- Customer perceived quality  
- Customer compliant  
 
QUALITY 
 
- Cost of scrap  
- Rework   
- Defect  
- Warranty cost  
- Sales return  
 
DELIVERY 
 
- On-time delivery   
 
CYCLE TIME 
 
- Product development time 
- Manufacturing lead time 
- Work station setup time 
 
iv. Performance Goals 
 
Does your firm set specific numeric targets for the following performance measures? (Anchoring on “Yes” or “No”) 
Note: Performance goals have the same performance measures as used in attention-directing feedback, item IV above. 
 
v. Empowerment 
 
(Anchored by 1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Neither Disagree Nor Agree, and 7=Strongly Agree) 
1.   Daily problems have been handled primarily by groups. 
2.  Group members actively provide input to both product and process design. 
3.  Vacation, back-up process, or unexpected changes in schedule are decided by work group members.  
4.  In our plant, group members are encouraged to generate input for hiring decisions within their groups. 
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